Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 2 Symposium: The Changing Landscape of
Collegiate Athletics

Article 12

The Jocks and the Justice: How Sotomayor
Restrained College Athletes
Phillip J. Closius

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons
Repository Citation
Phillip J. Closius, The Jocks and the Justice: How Sotomayor Restrained College Athletes, 26 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 493 (2016)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol26/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

CLOSIUS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

6/14/2016 5:30 PM

THE JOCKS AND THE JUSTICE: HOW
SOTOMAYOR RESTRAINED COLLEGE
ATHLETES
PHILLIP J. CLOSIUS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Two judicial opinions have shaped the modern college athletic world.1
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma2 declared the NCAA’s
exclusive control over the media rights to college football violated the Sherman
Act.3 That decision allowed universities and conferences to control their own
media revenue and laid the foundation for the explosion of coverage and income
in college football today.4 Clarett v. NFL held that the provision then in the
National Football League’s (NFL) Constitution and By-Laws that prohibited
players from being eligible for the NFL draft until three years from the date of
their high school graduation was immune from Sherman Act liability because it
was protected by the non-statutory labor law exemption.5 An earlier decision,
Haywood v. NBA,6 declared the National Basketball Association’s (NBA)
age-based draft eligibility rule an illegal group boycott and a per se violation of
the Sherman Act.7 Therefore, at the time of the Clarett decision, the NFL was

* Phillip J. Closius is a Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. A.B. University
of Notre Dame (1972); J.D., Columbia (1975). The Author wishes to express his appreciation for the
research assistance of Jacob Deaven, University of Baltimore School of Law (2016) and James Hetzel,
University of Baltimore School of Law (2015).
1. Although this Article only deals with football and basketball, these two sports provide most of
the income for college athletic departments and support almost all other college sports. Therefore,
significant developments in those two sports can be fairly characterized as influencing all of collegiate
athletics. See Kristi Dosh, Does Football Fund Other Sports at College Level?, FORBES (May 5, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/05/05/does-football-fund-other-sports-at-collegelevel/.
2. See generally 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
3. Id. at 88 (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2016)).
4. The NCAA case is beyond the scope of this Article.
5. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
6. 401 U.S. 1204, (1971).
7. Id. at 1205–07. The Court in Haywood did not consider the non-statutory labor exemption.
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the only professional league that had age-based eligibility rules.8
Young talent in sports fascinates the American public. Bryce Harper and
Mike Trout dominate discussion of the best all-around player in Major League
Baseball. Ginger Howard makes headlines as an eighteen-year-old member of
the Ladies Professional Golfers Association. Connor McDavid is an
eighteen-year-old left wing drafted first by the Edmonton Oilers in the 2015
National Hockey League Draft. Leonard Fournette, a nineteen-year-old running
back at Louisiana State University, makes the cover of ESPN and Sports
Illustrated. Karl-Anthony Towns and Jahlil Okafor dominate college basketball
as freshmen and then become the first and third picks in the 2015 NBA Draft.
However, collegiate football and basketball players are treated differently
from athletes in all other sports in the modern legal reality. Although Fournette
is widely acknowledged as being NFL ready and he risks his earning potential
with every carry, he cannot become an NFL player until a certain amount of
time has passed since his high school graduation—maybe. Article 6, section
2(b) of the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) states:
No player shall be permitted to apply for special eligibility for
selection in the Draft, or otherwise be eligible for the Draft, until three NFL regular seasons have begun and ended
following either his graduation from high school or graduation
of the class with which he entered high school, whichever is
earlier.9
As written, the provision does not give a player with three years of college
football experience a right to enter the draft—it only allows him to petition for
a special exemption. Although no third-year player has in fact been denied, the
college football player only receives unconditional eligibility for the draft three
years after his high school graduation and the exhaustion of his college
eligibility or four years after his high school graduation.10
The NBA is kinder to young talent by providing both an unqualified and a
shorter period of eligibility for its draft. The NBA CBA provides that an eligible
player must be at least nineteen years of age during the calendar year of the draft
8. Alan C. Milstein, The Maurice Clarett Story: A Justice System Failure, 20 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 216, 225 (2015).
9. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 6, § 2(b) (2011), https://nflpaweb
.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CBA_Searchable_Bookmarked.pdf
[hereinafter NFL CBA].
10. See The Rules of the Draft, NFL FOOTBALL OPERATIONS, http://operations.nfl.com/the-players/the-nfl-draft/the-rules-of-the-draft/ (last visited June 9, 2016). However, because almost no player
exhausts his eligibility in three years, this is, in effect, a four-year from high school graduation rule.
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and at least one NBA season must have passed since the player’s high school
graduation.11 The NBA CBA also states, “The player has expressed his desire
to be selected in the Draft in a writing received by the NBA at least sixty (60)
days prior to such Draft (an “Early Entry” player).”12 However, the NBA
owners proposed in the collective bargaining process of 2011 that the age limit
be raised to twenty years old.13 The proposal was not embodied in the final
CBA. However, new NBA Commissioner Adam Silver announced his support
for increasing the draft eligible age to twenty in his first press conference as
Commissioner.14 Colleges and universities continue to pressure the NBA to
increase the age and number of NBA seasons since high school graduation for
draft eligibility.15 Because the draft eligibility rule in both sports is now included in the leagues’ respective CBAs, any change to either at this point would
require the consent of the respective players’ unions.
How are these restrictions valid? Why can football and basketball players
not earn a living with their skills—like every other athlete and American worker
can? The Clarett opinion, authored by then Second Circuit Judge Sotomayor,
confirmed the validity of eligibility restrictions in the NFL (and by implication
the NBA)16 and has not been seriously questioned since the date of the
decision.17 The influence of the opinion is at least partly explained by its author’s appointment to the United States Supreme Court. Judge Sotomayor held
that the NFL’s eligibility requirements were immune from the Sherman Act because they fell within the purview of federal labor law.18 The Clarett opinion
therefore never reached the antitrust analysis that produced the decision in
Haywood.
11. NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art X, § 1(b)(i) (2011), http://nbpa.com/cba/
[hereinafter NBA CBA].
12. Id. art X, § 1(b)(ii)(F). The CBA lists under section 1(b)(ii) a variety of circumstances that make
a player eligible for the draft. See id. art X, § 1(b)(ii). Subsection (F) is the only one applicable to this
Article.
13. Michael A. McCann, Justice Sonia Sotomayor and the Relationship Between Leagues and
Players: Insights and Implications, 42 CONN. L. REV. 901, 904 (2011). The NBA has been pressured
for years to raise the eligibility limits to two years from high school graduation and twenty years old.
See id.
14. Howard Beck, New Commissioner Adam Silver Argues Minimum Age of 20 Better for NBA,
NCAA Games, BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 15, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1961874-new-commissioner-silver-argues-minimum-age-of-20-better-for-nba-and-ncaa-games.
15. Jake New, Done with One-and-Done?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/02/23/conferences-weigh-freshman-ineligibility-rule-basketball-players.
16. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
17. The NBA adopted its current age-based draft eligibility restriction in its 2005 CBA. Christian
Dennie, From Clarett to Mayo: The Antitrust Labor Exemption Argument Continues, 8 TEX. REV. ENT.
& SPORTS L. 63, 74 (2007). That CBA was finalized on July 29, 2005, fourteen months after the Clarett
decision. Id.
18. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 125.
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The stability of college football and basketball as currently constituted
depends on continued acceptance of the Clarett opinion. If the Clarett result is
overturned, college basketball loses many of its young stars. The effect on
college football would be unprecedented as talented players could never play
collegially or leave the college game whenever they wanted. The impact on
elite teams would be magnified, as the star players would be the most likely
early departures. Because most college athletic departments are dependent on
the revenue from basketball and football,19 a decrease in income from those
sports due to a lack of marquee players would affect the very existence of other
collegiate sports.
Clarett was, in fact, wrongly decided in 2004. The result it produced is even
less defensible for the current NFL and NBA. While the opinion saved college
football and basketball, its legal reasoning is seriously flawed. The failure to
consider the relationship between the NFL and the NCAA constitutes its biggest
deficiency.20 The NFL eligibility rule is much more that a restraint on a class
of prospective players. The restraint supports the financial structure of college
football and saves each NFL team millions of dollars in developmental costs.
This conspiracy inhibits entry-level competition in professional football and
allows both the universities and the NFL to enjoy monopolistic profits at the
expense of college football players. The predatory effect of the NFL’s group
boycott is even more pernicious when draft eligibility is denied to college
players unquestionably ready to play in the NFL. Their ability to profit from
their skills is delayed strictly to protect the financial interests of the NFL and
the NCAA Division I universities.
The second section of this Article briefly reviews the history of the
non-statutory labor law exemption. The third section describes both the district
court and Second Circuit opinions in Clarett. The fourth section argues that the
Second Circuit misunderstood the nature of NFL’s eligibility rule and
misapplied its sports law precedent. The fifth section argues that Judge
Sotomayor improperly applied what was effectively the preemption test
employed in the seminal sports law case of Mackey v. NFL.21 The final section
of the Article demonstrates that, if the exemption does not apply, the eligibility
provisions do, in fact, violate the Sherman Act.

19. See Dosh, supra note 1.
20. The Clarett case only concerned the NFL. See generally Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124. As such, this
Article speaks mainly of the NFL. However, all the legal analysis contained herein applies equally to
the NBA.
21. See generally 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
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II. THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR LAW EXEMPTION
The non-statutory labor law exemption was created by the Supreme Court
to effectuate the statutory exemption from antitrust liability provided by
Congress for union activity.22 After Supreme Court decisions held that unions
were a violation of the Sherman Act,23 the Clayton Act provided, in relevant
part, that labor unions are not illegal combinations in restraint of trade.24
Subsequently, the Norris-LaGuardia Act further restricted the equity
jurisdiction of federal courts in matters involving a “labor dispute.”25 The
Supreme Court expanded this exemption for unilateral union activity to include
collectively bargained, joint management-labor agreements in Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.26
The Supreme Court later explained the nature of the exemption in Local Union
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.:
Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours
restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately
related to wages, hours and working conditions that the
unions’ successful attempt to obtain that provision through
bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining in pursuit of their own
labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in
combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection
of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from the
Sherman Act. We think that it is.27
Other Supreme Court cases indicated that the exemption would not apply if
the union participated in the competitive interests of the employer28 or if the
agreement restrained the business or product market to an extent not justified
by a union’s fundamental interest in eliminating competition among employees
regarding wages and working conditions.29
The exemption only applies to complaints alleging violations of federal
22. United States v. Hutcheson, 310 U.S. 219, 236–37 (1941).
23. See generally, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
24. See generally Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2016).
25. Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104–05, 113 (2016).
26. See generally 325 U.S. 797 (1945). This case created the non-statutory labor exemption.
27. 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965) (footnote omitted).
28. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665–66 (1965).
29. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
625–26 (1975).
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antitrust statutes, most notably the Sherman Act. The exemption’s application
to lawsuits against employers by employees has primarily occurred in the
context of sports litigation.30 Mackey v. NFL involved a lawsuit by NFL players
against the league alleging that the Rozelle Rule was a violation of the Sherman
Act.31 The Rozelle Rule allowed the Commissioner of the NFL to provide any
team that lost a free agent player to another team with compensation that the
Commissioner, in his sole discretion, determined to be appropriate.32 The
players argued that the imposed compensation was a per se violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act or, in the alternative, a violation of the Rule of Reason,
which emanated from the same statutory provision.33 The Eighth Circuit
expanded the exemption by initially ruling that the immunity applied to the
CBA, not just the union, and therefore the NFL could also assert the exemption
as the management signee.34 The opinion then delineated a three-part test for
the exemption’s applicability:
1. “the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to
the collective bargaining relationship”; and
2. “the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining” (i.e., wages, hours,
or terms and conditions of employment); and
3. “the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona
fide arm’s-length bargaining.”35
The Eighth Circuit then concluded that the Rozelle Rule did satisfy the first
two criteria of its test but was not the product of bona fide arm’s length
bargaining.36 Therefore, the NFL’s liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act
needed to be assessed.37 The Mackey opinion then stated that the per se rules of
section 1 should not be applied to the NFL given the uniqueness of professional

30. See Phillip J. Closius, Not at the Behest of Nonlabor Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a
Maturing Sports Industry, 24 B.C. L. REV. 341, 348 (1983).
31. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976).
32. Id. at 610–11.
33. Id. at 609–10.
34. Id. at 612.
35. Id. at 614 (citing Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Smith v. Pro Football, 542 F. Supp. 462 (D.D.C.
1976); Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 496–500 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
36. Id. at 615–16.
37. Id. at 616.
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sports as an industry.38 The Eighth Circuit finally concluded by holding that the
Rozelle Rule violated the Rule of Reason liability standard of section 1.39 The
Mackey three-part test delineating the exemption’s applicability has been
adopted by other circuits.40
The Supreme Court decided a post-Mackey case involving the exemption
and professional football in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.41 In that decision, the
Supreme Court resolved an issue that had confounded the Circuits—did the
exemption apply to provisions unilaterally imposed by an employer after the
expiration of the applicable CBA? In negotiations to create a new CBA, the
NFL and the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) had
reached an impasse.42 The owners had proposed a developmental or practice
squad, and the NFLPA wanted such players to be free to negotiate their own
compensation packages.43 The NFL wanted to impose a set salary scale for all
such players.44 Following impasse, the NFL unilaterally imposed its wage
scale.45 Brown, a practice squad player, initiated an antitrust lawsuit against his
team for refusing to bargain with him.46 The Supreme Court ruled against
Brown by holding that the exemption continues after impasse as long as the term
was the product of the collective bargaining process and the employer and union
remained in a collective bargaining relationship.47 Although the Brown opinion
does not cite the Mackey decision, the Brown description of the appropriate
application of the exemption appears to mirror the three-part Mackey test:
That conduct took place during and immediately after a
collective-bargaining negotiation. It grew out of, and was
directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining
process. It involved a matter that the parties were required to
negotiate collectively. And it concerned only the parties to the
collective-bargaining relationship.48
38. Id. at 619–20.
39. Id. at 622.
40. See, e.g., Cont’l Mar. of S.F., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, Metal Trades Dep’t,
817 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1196–97 (6th Cir.
1979); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403–04 (D.D.C. 1986).
41. See generally 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
42. Id. at 235.
43. Id. at 234.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 235.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 250.
48. Id.
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The first two sentences quoted refer to the term being a product of good
faith bargaining. The final two sentences incorporate the mandatory subject of
bargaining and the aspect of only affecting parties to the relationship prongs of
the Mackey test. The Brown decision therefore expands the duration of the exemption and appears to support Mackey as the test for the exemption’s
applicability.
III. THE DECISIONS IN CLARETT
Maurice Clarett was a highly recruited high school running back who
eventually chose to enroll at the Ohio State University (OSU). He graduated
from high school on December 11, 2001, and enrolled early at OSU. Clarett
lived up to his reputation by becoming the first freshman running back starter at
the school since 1943. He led his team to an undefeated season in 2002 and
Ohio State’s first national championship in thirty-four years, beating the
University of Miami in the Fiesta Bowl in January 2003. Clarett was named
Big Ten Freshman of the Year and the best running back in college football by
The Sporting News. However, Clarett was suspended by OSU and the NCAA
for the entire 2003 football season because he accepted impermissible benefits
in violation of NCAA rules.49 Clarett believed he would also be suspended for
the 2004 football season.50 Having already missed his sophomore season, Clarett feared that he would not be able to play football for two full years. Such a
long absence would diminish his value to the NFL. Clarett then sued the league
in an effort to be eligible for the 2004 NFL draft.51
The district court properly stated that the lawsuit turned on three major
issues: (1) Did the non-statutory labor law exemption preempt the lawsuit
because federal labor policy provided antitrust immunity for the eligibility
restrictions at issue?; (2) If not, did Clarett lack standing because he had not
suffered an antitrust injury?; and (3) If Clarett has standing, do the eligibility
restrictions satisfy the Rule of Reason test imposed in sports cases to determine
antitrust liability?52 The district court answered all of these questions in the
negative and granted summary judgment in favor of Clarett.53
In determining the reach of the exemption, the district court cited the

49. Clarett Allowed to Keep Scholarship, ESPN (Sept. 11, 2003), http://espn.go.com/college-football/news/story?id=1612990.
50. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 382.
53. Id.
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three-part test enunciated in Mackey.54 The opinion noted that the eligibility
rules were not mandatory subjects of bargaining because the rule at issue
precluded players from entering the labor market and therefore “affects wages
only in the sense that a player subject to the Rule will earn none.”55 The district
court also stated, “The exemption is also inapplicable because the Rule only
affects players, like Clarett, who are complete strangers to the bargaining
relationship.”56 Finally, the opinion concluded “the NFL has failed to
demonstrate that the Rule evolved from arm’s-length negotiations between the
NFLMC and the NFLPA.”57 The rule did not arise from, nor was agreed to
during, the process of collective bargaining.58 The eligibility rule therefore
failed all three prongs of the Mackey test and the exemption was inapplicable.59
The district court then determined that Clarett suffered an antitrust injury
and therefore had standing.60 His allegation that a group boycott precluded him,
and all others similarly situated, from competing for a job in a defined market
satisfied the injury requirement.61 Clarett also explicitly alleged that the
restraint at issue resulted from conduct by the defendants.62 Clarett had standing
because he was not alleging that he had lost an employment opportunity
to another in a competitive job market.63 He alleged that he and others like him
“have been foreclosed from entering the market altogether. ‘They are not losers
in a competitive marketplace; they are not even allowed in the game.’”64 The
injury should be more pronounced for players like Clarett who are
unquestionably qualified to play in the NFL.65 The NFL’s enforced delay is the
injury.66
The district court then turned to the final issue described above—judging
the viability of the eligibility rule pursuant to the Rule of Reason test under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.67 Under such an analysis, the plaintiff must show

54. Id. at 391.
55. Id. at 395.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 396.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 397.
60. Id. at 403–04.
61. Id. at 403.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 400 (quoting Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Football
League’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379).
65. See id.
66. See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
67. Id. at 404–07.
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an actual adverse effect on competition.68 If successful, the defendant may then
demonstrate the pro-competitive benefits of their activity.69 If defendants are
successful, the plaintiff may then show that said benefits could be achieved by
less restrictive alternatives—activities less harmful to competition.70 Clarett
met his burden by alleging that the group boycott at issue adversely restrained
trade by the NFL’s denial of market entry to certain sellers of services (i.e.,
players less than three years removed from high school graduation) in the
market of professional football.71 The NFL then offered four justifications for
the eligibility rule based on protecting younger players and reducing its costs.72
The district court dismissed the protection of younger player rationales out of
hand by noting that, while there may be concerns, they have nothing to do with
promoting competition in the market.73 The economic justifications also failed
because the NFL’s desire to keep its costs down was not pro-competitive in any
way—in fact, most antitrust violations are done because they inure to the
financial benefit of the defendants.74 The district court concluded by noting
that, even if the justifications were pro-competitive, the ability to screen and test
candidates for the NFL draft was a less restrictive alternative for accomplishing
all the proffered justifications.75
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court on the exemption
issue and therefore did not reach the antitrust issues contained in the district
court opinion.76 The opinion began by characterizing the NFL as a
multi-employer bargaining unit, an arrangement both provided for and
promoted by federal labor law.77 The court then reviewed the history of the
non-statutory labor law exemption and the applicable Supreme Court
precedent.78 Judge Sotomayor then decided that the Mackey test was not
appropriate for use in a case alleging a restraint on a labor market brought by
employees rather than a restraint on a product market brought by other
employers.79 She specifically noted that Clarett did not contend that the
eligibility rules worked to the disadvantage of the NFL’s competitors in the
68. Id. at 404.
69. Id. at 405.
70. Id. at 405–06.
71. Id. at 406.
72. Id. at 408.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 408–09.
75. Id. at 410.
76. See generally Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
77. Id. at 130.
78. See generally id. at 130–34.
79. Id. at 133–34.
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market for professional football or in some manner to protect the NFL’s
dominance in that market.80 The opinion then stated that the Mackey test should
not be applied when “the plaintiff complains of a restraint upon a unionized
labor market characterized by a collective bargaining relationship with a
multi-employer bargaining unit,”81 to which Judge Sotomayor cited Wood v.
NBA,82 Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass’n,83 NBA v. Williams,84 and Brown
v. Pro Football, Inc.85 to support this conclusion.
The Second Circuit then described the issue as “whether subjecting the
NFL’s eligibility rules to antitrust scrutiny would ‘subvert fundamental
principles of our federal labor policy.’”86 A base principle of federal labor law
was that, once a bargaining relationship was established, “prospective players
no longer have the right to negotiate directly with the NFL teams over the terms
and conditions of their employment.”87 Labor policy meant that “the NFL teams
are permitted to engage in joint conduct with respect to the terms and conditions
of players’ employment as a multi-employer bargaining unit without risking
antitrust liability.”88 The terms and conditions of Clarett’s employment were
therefore committed to the collective bargaining process in which the NFLPA
has the labor law right to make concessions as it sees fit and to favor veterans
over rookies if such a choice benefits the unit and is consistent with a union’s
duty of fair representation.89 However, these general labor concepts were not
controversial or actually in dispute in the lawsuit.
The critical part of the opinion began with Judge Sotomayor overruling the
district court by holding that the eligibility rule was a mandatory subject of
bargaining.90 She first based this conclusion on her belief that the eligibility
rule has “tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL
players.”91 Proof of that effect was the complex collectively bargained for
system of the NFL draft, salary pools for rookies, team salary caps, and free
agency that combined to influence an individual player’s compensation.92 The
80. Id. at 134.
81. Id.
82. See generally 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
83. See generally 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
84. See generally 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
85. See generally 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
86. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 138 (quoting Wood, 809 F.2d at 959).
87. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 138.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 139.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 140.
92. Id.
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second justification for the holding was the reduction in competition in the
market for entering players caused by the eligibility rule, which, in turn,
affected the job security of veteran players.93 “Because the size of NFL teams
is capped, the eligibility rules diminish a veteran player’s risk of being
replaced by either a drafted rookie or a player who enters the draft and, though
not drafted, is then hired as a rookie free agent.”94 The Second Circuit noted
that “the preservation of jobs for union members is not violative [sic] of the
anti-trust laws.”95 The opinion finished its analysis of this issue by concluding
that simply because the eligibility rules harmed prospective players rather than
current players did not make them violations of the Sherman Act.96 Labor law
rather than antitrust law must therefore control any challenge to a mandatory
subject of bargaining, and labor law permitted the NFL and the NFLPA to agree
that an employee will not be hired or considered for employment for nearly any
reason whatsoever, which is not an unfair labor practice or an act of
discrimination made illegal by statute.97
The opinion concluded by noting that the exemption applies even though
the eligibility rule was not contained in the CBA.98 The eligibility rule was in
fact contained only in the NFL Constitution and By-Laws.99 However, the
NFLPA certainly was aware of the eligibility rule and a copy of the NFL
Constitution and By-Laws was presented to the NFLPA during negotiations.100
Because the eligibility rule was a mandatory subject of bargaining, the NFLPA
could have forced the NFL to bargain on it and, for whatever reason, it did not
do so.101 In addition, the NFLPA agreed in the CBA to waive its right to
challenge any provision in the NFL Constitution and By-Laws, effectively
agreeing to the eligibility rule contained therein.102 Labor law precluded any
individual player from challenging the unique bundle of compromises made by
the union in the collective bargaining process that produced the agreement.103
The Second Circuit therefore reversed the district court and remanded with
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1971)).
95. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 140 (quoting Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. N.Y. Shipping
Ass’n, 426 F.2d 884, 887–88 (2d Cir. 1970)).
96. Id. The court cited broad precedent establishing the validity of “hiring halls” as proof of its
conclusion. Id. at 140–41.
97. Id. at 141.
98. See id. at 142.
99. Id. at 127. The 2011 NFL CBA does contain the modern eligibility rule in Article 6, § 2(b).
100. Id. at 142.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 142–43.
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instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the NFL.104 The opinion
also vacated the order of the district court designating Clarett as eligible for the
2004 NFL draft.105
IV. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR MISUNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE ELIGIBILITY
RULE AND THE DRAFT IN THE NFL
Clarett was only challenging the NFL’s eligibility rule, alleging that the
group boycott that refused to consider him for the NFL draft until a certain year
occurred violated the Sherman Act. Clarett did not challenge the NFL draft
itself, the rookie salary cap, the adequacy of his individual compensation, or any
other term or condition of employment contained in the NFL CBA or the NFL
Constitution and By-Laws. Therefore, the Second Circuit was wrong to
analogize Clarett to a disgruntled job applicant.106 He was not asking to be
eligible for a job—he wanted to be eligible for the draft. The draft is a
procedure unique to professional sports. Both the NBA and the NFL
extensively scout all college players and medically examine and physically test
all draft eligible players.107 Every NFL team knew who Clarett was and
extensively scouted him during his one year at Ohio State. Therefore, if Clarett
had won his case, he would not have been guaranteed a job on an NFL team.
He would have simply been subjected to the standard process of player
evaluation that had already begun for him. Clarett was not deluded about his
qualifications or bitter about an imaginary slight that cost him a career
opportunity. Clarett would have been drafted in the early rounds of the draft if
he was eligible.108 The NFL did not dispute that fact. The NFL just arbitrarily
told him that he needed to wait until the subsequent year’s draft and employed
a group boycott to enforce its decision.
A draft only has a predetermined number of selections. The NFL draft has

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 141. “But Clarett is in this respect no different from the typical worker who is
confident that he or she has the skills to fill a job vacancy but does not possess the qualifications or
meet the requisite criteria that have been set.” Id. For an extensive critique on the inappropriateness
of equating a uniquely qualified professional athlete to “a garbage man,” see Christian Dennie, Is
Clarett Correct? A Glance at the Purview of the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 6 TEX. REV. ENT. &
SPORTS L. 1, 18–19 (2005).
107. See Kurt Helin, NBA Draft Combine Starts Wednesday in Chicago... But What Does That
Mean?, NBC SPORTS (May 14, 2014), http://nba.nbcsports.com/2014/05/14/nba-draft-combine-startswednesday-in-chicago-but-what-does-that-mean/; Dave Siebert, An Inside Look into the NFL Medical
Exam Process at the Combine, BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 21, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1968230-an-inside-look-into-the-nfl-medical-exam-process-at-the-combine.
108. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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seven rounds with each team receiving one pick.109 Therefore, there will be 224
players selected every year.110 The NBA draft has only two rounds with each
team receiving one pick.111 Therefore, there will be sixty players selected every
year. The number of rookies selected is constant regardless of how many
players are eligible to be drafted. The CBAs do not expressly limit the number
of undrafted rookie free agents a team may sign but effectively a ceiling is
placed on that number due to roster limitations on the number of players a team
may have under contract in the off season and the preseason training camp.
Each NFL team may have a maximum of ninety players under contract during
such period,112 and each NBA team may have a maximum of twenty players
under contract during such period.113 Both numbers are constant and do not
vary with the number of players eligible for the draft. Teams in both leagues
are customarily at the maximum for the beginning of preseason training camp.
Therefore, had Clarett been eligible for the draft, his presence would not have
increased the number of rookies entering the league. He would have been added
to a roster at the expense of another eligible rookie player.
Judge Sotomayor compounded her misunderstanding by supporting her
result with four sports law cases that were distinguishable from Clarett’s
allegations—Wood, Caldwell, Williams, and Brown.114 Although each of these
cases contributed significantly to the legal evolution of the non-statutory labor
exemption, none of them dealt with an eligibility rule and only Wood involved
a draft.115 The black letter law for which Judge Sotomayor cited them was not
in dispute at the time of the Clarett decision or now. However, no case holds
that all group activity by a multi-employer unit is exempt from an antitrust
lawsuit by a member of a labor group. The cases indicate that some group
activity by such a unit is exempt. The application of the exemption is therefore
fact specific. The Second Circuit opinion does not explain why decisions
unrelated to an eligibility rule should control the result in Clarett.116
109. NFL CBA, supra note 9, at art 6, § 2(a).
110. It is possible for a few more players to be drafted in any given year because the NFL CBA
provides for an additional round of compensation picks that provide compensation for any team losing
an unrestricted free agent to another team. Id. This provision provides for a maximum of thirty-two
additional selections. See id. Many years produced no compensation picks.
111. NBA CBA, supra note 11, at art X, § 3(a).
112. Matt Verderame, NFL Roster Cut Deadlines and Rules, SBNATION (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2013/8/22/4647088/nfl-roster-cut-deadlines-rules-preseason.
113. Larry Coon, Larry Coon’s NBA Salary Cap FAQ, NBA SALARY CAP FAQ,
www.cbafaq.com//salarycap.htm#Q79 (last updated Mar. 20, 2016).
114. See Dennie, supra note 106, at 14–17.
115. See id.
116. Judge Sotomayor states that the eligibility rule is part of the complex process of draft, salary
caps, and other devices by which wages in the NFL are determined. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369
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In Wood, a drafted player sued the NBA, alleging that the NBA draft and
the NBA salary caps lessened his individual compensation and therefore
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.117 Wood argued that the exemption did
not apply to his claims because the first prong of the Mackey test was not
satisfied—the draft affected prospective players who had not signed an NBA
contract and who were not yet a party to the collective bargaining
relationship.118 The draft and salary caps were agreements among horizontal
competitors to eliminate competition in the market of college players.119 The
Second Circuit held that the exemption included the draft, salary cap, and other
conditions of entry even if the union had effectively disadvantaged new union
members to the betterment of senior union members.120 Labor law and the
collective bargaining process therefore controlled the compensation limits and
job assignments of players entering the NBA.121 However, the Wood challenge
is not the one presented in Clarett even though the Clarett opinion treats it as if
it were. Clarett did not challenge the draft or any salary cap terms—in fact, he
desperately supports them. Wood was drafted and, after receiving a contract
offer he considered inadequate, asked to be declared a free agent. Clarett is
denied the opportunity to be considered for the immediate draft in spite of the
fact that he is not qualified to play football in the only other similar alternative
available to him—college football.122
In Caldwell, the plaintiff was the president of the players’ association for
the American Basketball Association.123 He alleged that the league’s teams
violated the Sherman Act by agreeing as a group to release him and boycott his
playing services in retaliation for his activities on behalf of the union.124 The
Second Circuit reasoned that the exemption should preclude Caldwell’s claim
because his allegations concerned the mandatory bargaining subject of hiring
and firing employees.125 His retaliatory discharge claims also involved activity
F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004). The eligibility rule therefore cannot be viewed in isolation. Id. The fact
specific nature of the exemption requires that the eligibility rule be viewed in isolation. Id. The
complexity of various CBA terms is insufficient to override this requirement. Id.
117. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 956–57 (2d Cir. 1987).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 958.
120. Id. at 963.
121. See id. at 962–63.
122. Although the Canadian Football League is a professional league, the facilities, media exposure,
and quality of are not equivalent to the NFL or major college football. See Rob Boffard, The
Little-Known Canadian Version of American Football, BBC NEWS (July 2, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33324426.
123. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F. 3d 523, 525 (2d Cir. 1995).
124. Id. at 526.
125. See id. at 528.
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that was protected by federal labor law.126 Both of these claims were subject to
appropriate labor law remedies.127 The exemption therefore applied and
Caldwell should pursue redress in an appropriate labor forum and not seek
compensation through antitrust litigation.128 The Caldwell fact pattern is
unrelated to Clarett’s claims regarding the eligibility rule. Caldwell was a
distinguished veteran player who was not only a long-standing member of the
bargaining unit but also president of the union. The decision to prioritize labor
law remedies over antitrust litigation was clearly justified by the Second Circuit’s opinion. However, Caldwell does not, and should not, establish the proposition that all joint or group activity by a multi-employer unit is exempt from
antitrust scrutiny. Caldwell does repeat the black letter law principle that some
joint or group activity by a multi-employer unit is exempt from antitrust scrutiny.129 In the determination of whether Clarett’s allegations fall within the exempt type of group activity, the Caldwell fact pattern is easily distinguishable
and the Caldwell result should have been given limited applicability.
In Williams, a class of current NBA players challenged the NBA’s draft and
salary cap as a violation of the Sherman Act.130 The NBA CBA had
expired, and the draft and salary cap were unilaterally implemented by
management after negotiations with the players’ union had reached impasse.131
The central issue in the case, therefore, was whether the exemption expired
when the CBA terminated or whether it continued until some later date.132 The
Second Circuit began its opinion by extolling the virtues of a multi-employer
bargaining unit and its necessity in the efficient organization of the business and
games of professional sports.133 Unilateral implementation by management of
a union rejected term was permitted by federal labor law.134 Because the entire
collective bargaining process was controlled in detail by labor principles, the
Williams court held that antitrust liability for an employer was inappropriate and
the exemption continued after the expiration of the CBA.135 Other circuits have
also decided that the exemption survived impasse and continued as long as a
collective bargaining relationship existed.136
126. Id. at 527–30.
127. Id. at 530.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 529–30.
130. NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 685–86 (2d Cir. 1995).
131. Id. at 686.
132. Id. at 687–88.
133. Id. at 689.
134. Id. at 693.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50
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In Brown, the Supreme Court agreed with the result in Williams and held
that the exemption did immunize an employer from antitrust liability for
unilaterally imposing proposed terms and conditions of employment after the
expiration of a CBA and impasse with a union.137 The NFL unilaterally
implemented a provision permitting each team to have a “developmental squad”
of players who had been waived by the league.138 Such developmental players
would not be able to negotiate their compensation individually but would all be
paid a league-wide salary for each game on the squad.139 A class of
developmental players challenged the imposition of a non-negotiable NFL
payment as a violation of the Sherman Act.140 The Court echoed the Williams
opinion by finding that allowing the imposition of antitrust liability after
impasse would call into question much of the conduct of a multi-employer
bargaining unit that was regulated in detail by federal labor laws.141 Federal
courts ruling in an antitrust context should not be able to usurp the National
Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) responsibility for policing the collective bargaining process.142 The exemption therefore continued for as long as a collective bargaining relationship existed between an employer and a union.143 The
Clarett opinion noted that Wood, Caldwell, and Williams were consistent with
Brown and therefore would be regarded as controlling precedent.144
Unfortunately, as the above analysis demonstrates, the four decisions cited
by Judge Sotomayor were not directly relevant to the resolution of Clarett’s
case. While the Williams and Brown opinions were significant in defining the
termination of the exemption, that issue was not raised by the Clarett facts.
Caldwell’s holding that a retaliatory discharge claim was exempt from antitrust
liability was equally inapposite to Clarett’s complaint. Although Wood is the
closest to relevance, his challenge to the draft and rookie salary cap provisions
F.3d 1041, 1058 (D.D.C. 1995). The Powell result forced the NFLPA to decertify as a union and
terminate its collective bargaining relationship with the NFL. At that point, the exemption expired.
137. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 240–42 (1996).
138. Id. at 234–35.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 235.
141. Id. at 237–42.
142. Id. at 240–42. Brown has been characterized as exempting a familiar multi-employer
bargaining tactic regarding a mandatory subject of bargaining that is permitted and regulated by the
NLRB. See Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 2010). As such, the
exemption protects activity that is essential to the collective bargaining process. See id.
143. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250. Years after the Brown decision, the NFLPA again decertified to
ensure that the exemption did not apply to a threatened antitrust lawsuit and to increase its leverage in
collective negotiations. League Locks Out Players After Union Decertifies, NFL (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81eb6e46/article/league-locks-out-players-after-union-decertifies.
144. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004).
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much more clearly involved terms and conditions of employment collectively
negotiated by the league and union. In fact, Judge Sotomayor specifically noted
that Clarett does not argue that Brown cast doubt on Wood, Caldwell, or
Williams.145 Both parties essentially agreed that the precedent cited held that
some, but not all, group activities by a multi-employer unit are exempt from
antitrust scrutiny.146 However, the cited cases did not provide any guidance as
to whether the eligibility rule fell within the exempted activity parameters or
not.
By repeatedly characterizing the eligibility rule as a “criteria for player
employment,”147 the Clarett opinion mischaracterizes the complaint at issue.
Eligibility for the draft is not the same as eligibility for a job in the unique setting
of professional sports. Clarett was not asking for a job—he was asking for the
chance to be tested. Sotomayor’s analogy to a union hiring hall perpetuates the
misconception.148 The hiring hall has been approved in certain multi-employer
industries (“most notably maritime, longshoring and construction”) when a
union acts essentially as a job referral service for union members on short-term
employment.149 The employees serviced are union members and part of the
bargaining unit. The hiring hall has no relation to professional sports. If an
employer can be compared to a union-run entity, the NFL is essentially saying
to prospective players “you are highly qualified and we have jobs but come back
next year.” That was the repudiated position of union hiring halls in the docks
of New York and New Jersey when they were controlled by criminals in the
1950s.150 No hiring hall would be permitted to foreclose workers on such a basis
in modern America.151 Similarly, the NFL’s group boycott arbitrarily denied
Clarett the chance to be turned down for a job (fully knowing he would not be
turned down), which should not be allowed.
V. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR IMPROPERLY REJECTED THE MACKEY TEST AND THEN
INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE MACKEY PRINCIPLES
The district court applied the three-part Mackey test and found the
eligibility rules failed to satisfy any of the Mackey factors.152 The Second
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 141.
148. Id. at 140–41.
149. See Milstein, supra note 8, at 244.
150. A position similar to a scene from the movie ON THE WATERFRONT (Horizon Pictures 1954).
151. See Kevin W. Brooks, “Physically Ready to Compete": Can Players' Unions Bar Potential
Draftees Based on Their Age?, 21 SPORTS LAW. J. 89, 122 n.221 (2014).
152. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 133.
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Circuit reversed the district court on this issue and explicitly rejected the Mackey
test when a plaintiff’s allegations only claimed an anticompetitive
effect on a collective bargained labor market rather than a product market. 153
However, the precedent cited by Judge Sotomayor does not support the
inapplicability of Mackey in a labor market context. The district court in Wood
explicitly relied on the three-prong Mackey test in its analysis.154 The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court opinion and never disagreed with the Mackey
test applied by the lower court.155 In addition, the appeals court clearly discusses
two of Mackey’s requirements—whether the rookies are parties to the collective
bargaining relationship156 and whether the draft is a mandatory subject of
bargaining.157
The Williams opinion also effectively utilizes Mackey
concepts.158 The Second Circuit inferred that players not yet under contract
were still part of the collective bargaining relationship.159 A significant amount
of the opinion also deals with the characterization of the alleged restraints as
mandatory subjects of bargaining.160 Finally, the Williams opinion cites Powell
v. NFL161 favorably to support its conclusion.162 Powell is an Eighth Circuit
decision that relied extensively on the Mackey test it previously created.163 The
Clarett opinion also fails to mention that the Mackey test was explicitly utilized
in labor market cases in the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits.164
Mackey is also consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The Clarett
opinion has a peculiar relationship with the non-Brown Supreme Court cases.
Judge Sotomayor first states that these cases are of limited assistance in
determining the reach of the exemption in labor market cases because they all
dealt with antitrust injuries to employers.165 However, in determining the best
alternative to Mackey, she cites a Second Circuit case that relies on the
exemption principles of Jewel Tea.166 However, Judge Sotomayor also
153. Id. at 134.
154. Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
155. See generally Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
156. Id. at 960.
157. Id. at 962–63.
158. See generally NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
159. See id. at 693.
160. Id. at 691.
161. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
162. Williams, 45 F.3d at 692–93.
163. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1298–1300.
164. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See generally Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d
124 (2d Cir. 2004).
165. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 134.
166. Id. at 133 (citing Local 210, Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Labor Relations Div. Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am., 844 F.2d 69, 80 n.2 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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acknowledges the commonly accepted position that the three-part test in
Mackey was specifically derived from Justice White’s opinion in Jewel Tea.167
The opinion’s treatment of Brown is equally confusing. The opinion frequently
cites Brown as supporting its holding but also admits that Brown left the
contours of the exemption undefined and expressed some reservations about the
lower court’s broad reading of the exemption as insulating all labor market
restraints from antitrust scrutiny.168 The Clarett opinion also fails to cite the
actual test enunciated in Brown, which is analogous to the Mackey test.169 The
Supreme Court precedent does not support the Clarett conclusion that the
Mackey test should not be utilized in a case alleging only injury in the labor
market.
However, if Judge Sotomayor stated that Mackey was not to be utilized in
Clarett, what test did she use instead of Mackey? The opinion indicates that
she, in fact, used Mackey test principles. The decision begins by stating that the
Mackey test is inappropriate and the first proper factor indicating the
exemption should not apply is that the alleged restraint is in the labor market
and not in the product market.170 However, this is simply a different way of
formulating the first prong of Mackey—the restraint must primarily affect only
those who are parties to the collective bargaining relationship. If the activity at
issue is affecting individuals or entities outside the bargaining relationship, the
restraint is by definition in the product market. The opinion then analyzes
whether the eligibility rules are mandatory subjects of bargaining171—an
inquiry identical to the second prong of Mackey. Finally, the decision concludes
by holding that the NFL’s Constitution and By-Laws (which contained the
eligibility rule at the time of the appeal)172 were present at the collective
negotiations between the NFL and the NFLPA.173 The court held that
knowledge of the provision combined with the NFLPA’s waiver of the right to
sue the NFL contained in the NFL CBA made it “clear that the union and the
NFL reached an agreement with respect to how the eligibility rules would be
handled.”174 This is simply a reformulation of the third prong of the Mackey
test—the restraint at issue must be the product of bona fide arm’s length
bargaining. Despite Judge Sotomayor’s repudiation of the Mackey test in
167. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 134.
168. Id. at 138.
169. See generally Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 124.
170. Id. at 133–34.
171. Id. at 140–41.
172. The 2011 NFL CBA explicitly includes the modern eligibility rules. See NFL CBA supra note
9 and accompanying text.
173. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 142.
174. Id. at 142.
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Clarett, she in fact employed it.
Whether Mackey is directly applied or an altered formulation of Mackey is
used, the Second Circuit improperly applied the applicable exemption
principles. The Mackey decision held that, if any one of the three elements of
the test was not met, the exemption would be denied and antitrust liability was
possible.175 Therefore, even if the Clarett opinion was correct that the eligibility
rules were the product of good faith bargaining, the exemption should be denied
if the restraint affected parties outside of the bargaining relationship or the
eligibility rules were not mandatory subjects of bargaining.176
As noted above, the Clarett opinion stated that the Mackey test was only
applicable when the restraint affected the competition in the product market, not
the labor market.177 The district court in Clarett spoke in Mackey’s terms by
concluding that prospective players were outside of the bargaining relationship,
and therefore the first requirement of the Mackey test was not satisfied.178
Although they reached different results on the exemption’s applicability, both
opinions focused on the relationship between a prospective player and the
bargaining unit. The district court held that Clarett was outside of the
bargaining unit,179 while the court of appeals held that the restraint at issue only
affected the labor market.180 Judge Sotomayor concluded
[t]his is simply not a case in which the NFL is alleged to have
conspired with its players union to drive its competitors out of
the market for professional football. . . . Nor does Clarett
contend that the NFL uses the eligibility rules as an unlawful
means of maintaining its dominant position in that market.181
Regardless, however, of which result is correct,182 both opinions neglect the
175. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615–18 (8th Cir. 1976). The Mackey v. NFL court denied the
exemption because the Rozelle Rule was not the product of good faith bargaining. Id. at 616. Even
though the first two prongs were met, the players still won. Id. at 623.
176. This Article assumes that the eligibility rules were the product of bona fide, good faith
bargaining. Even if such a conclusion was incorrect in Clarett, the inclusion of the eligibility rules in
both the current NFL CBA and NBA CBA justify the propriety of such an assumption.
177. No Supreme Court case explicitly makes such a distinction between the labor and product
market
regarding the exemption. Milstein, supra note 8, at 234.
178. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 395–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
179. See id.
180. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2004).
181. Id. (citations omitted) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665
(1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 809 (1945)).
182. The Author believes the district court has the more persuasive argument on this issue.
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most important issue posed by the eligibility rule—the relationship between the
NFL (and the NBA) and the NCAA. By focusing on Clarett’s relationship to
the NFL, the district court failed to see that the parties affected outside the
bargaining unit were also the NCAA and potential competitors to the NFL. The
court of appeals did not understand that the eligibility rule impacts the product
market because the rule benefits college football and strengthens the NFL’s
ability to foreclose entry-level competition. In the language of Jewel Tea, the
case cited by Judge Sotomayor as controlling, the eligibility restraints are “at
the behest of . . . [a] non-labor group[]” and therefore the exemption should not
apply.183
The eligibility rule supports the current revenue structure of college
football and basketball. By keeping stars in college for either three years
(football) or one year (basketball), college teams have increased ticket prices,
sold record amounts of merchandise, and signed multi-billion dollar media
contracts.184 Much of this ever-increasing revenue stream would be imperiled
if the best football and basketball players were not forced to attend college.
Financial concerns are at least one of the reasons why the NCAA consistently
pressures the NBA to increase the mandated years in college from one to two or
three years.185 The NCAA is, in Mackey terms, an outsider to the collective
bargaining relationship and, in Clarett terms, an entity in the product, not the
labor, market.
Why would the NFL and the NBA want to protect the financial stability of
the NCAA, an organization with which they are not affiliated? The NCAA
serves as the equivalent of baseball’s minor leagues for both sports, but with the
added benefit of handing to each league players who are already stars. The
increased media attention to both the NFL and the NBA drafts affirms the
importance of having players enter the leagues who are already famous.186 In
addition, the NFL and the NBA do not incur the costs of running a full minor
league developmental system as Major League Baseball teams are required to
do.187 This arrangement is particularly important to the NFL because the risk of
183. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965).
184. See, e.g., Eric Chemi, The Amazing Growth in College Football Revenues, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
27, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-09-26/the-amazing-growth-in-college-football-revenues.
185. New, supra note 15.
186. See Ed Sherman, ESPN’s Chris Berman Has Seen NFL Draft’s Popularity Soar, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/columnists/ct-nfl-draft-espn-sherman-mediaspt-0427-20150426-column.html.
187. The NBA does support the “D-League” for developmental players. NBA Development League:
DLeague FAQs, NBA D-LEAGUE, http://www.nba.com/dleague/santacruz/dleague_faqs.html (last
visited June 9, 2016). The D-League is not a true minor league in that star or even good NBA players
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a debilitating injury in three years of college football is significant.188 If the
NFL had its own minor league system, the teams would be paying signing
bonuses and salaries to players for three years after high school graduation. If
a player was injured during that period, the team would absorb the financial loss.
If a player gets hurt in college under the current system, the medical costs are
borne by the school, the job risk is on the player, and there are no economic
consequences for the NFL teams.189 Financially stable college football and
basketball programs therefore significantly lower costs for both the NFL and
the NBA and save them millions of dollars in risk avoidance. Both of these
financial benefits increase the profitability of teams in each league. Being
handed pre-made marketable stars also increases the revenue of both leagues.190
In classic economic and antitrust theory, higher profits and increasing
revenue by a monopolist should produce entry-level competition that reduces
prices and enhances efficiency.191 In professional football and basketball, lower
costs and increased revenue means that both the NFL and the NBA have more
money to spend on player salaries and related costs and practice and playing
facilities. Higher player salaries and better facilities create ever higher barriers
to entry-level competition. Despite an enormous increase in the profitability
and market value of all NFL and NBA teams in the last two decades, no new
professional league in either sport has arisen to challenge the NFL and NBA’s
respective monopoly. Instead, ticket prices and media payments in both sports
increase annually and, correspondingly, the monopolists in each league get
wealthier. In part because of the alliance with the NCAA, entry-level
competition in professional football or basketball is cost prohibitive. These
results are inconsistent with the goals of federal antitrust law.192
The current arrangement therefore incentivizes the NFL, the NBA, the
NFLPA, and the National Basketball Association Players Association
(NBAPA) to continue the restrictive eligibility rules already in place, or, in the
case of professional basketball, make them more restrictive. Both the
universities and the leagues profit enormously from the current eligibility rules.
The only people injured by this structure are the prospective players like Clarett.
never appear in it. The D-League is designed for players hoping to become fringe players in the NBA.
See id.
188. See, e.g., Jeffrey Perkel, High School, College Football Comes with Risk, ABC NEWS (Mar.
23, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Healthday/story?id=4508074&page=1.
189. Milstein supra note 8, at 226. The article notes that “Major League Baseball teams each spend
[approximately $9] million annually [on] their minor league” affiliates. Id.
190. See, e.g., Tim Tebow Is Slightly Less Marketable Than Oprah, but Is a Slightly Better
Quarterback, YAHOO SPORTS (Mar. 27, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nfl-shutdown-corner/tim-tebow-slightly-less-marketable-oprah-slightly-better-213040534.html.
191. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 525 (2004).
192. See id.
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The prospective players alone bear the risk of injury and the loss of three years
or one year worth of income. The lost income is particularly injurious to
football players who have a much shorter professional life.193 Given the limited
time in which a professional athlete is at his peak, the players can never recover
the income they have lost.
Judge Sotomayor’s statement at the conclusion of the Clarett opinion is
therefore simply wrong. Clarett is a case in which the NFL conspired with the
players’ union to drive competitors out of the market for professional football.
Clarett is a case in which the NFL was using unlawful means to maintain its
dominant position in the market of professional football. In that context,
federal antitrust policies trump incidental labor law benefits.194 The exemption
should have been denied for failing the first requirement of the Mackey test or
for its impact on both the labor and the product market, depending on which
language is preferred. Clarett alleged a conspiracy to restrain trade that
extended well beyond player wages.195 Exemption is inappropriate for restraints
that have significant impact in the product market even if they also have an
impact in the labor market.196
In addition, both the district court and the court of appeals agreed that the
eligibility rule must be a mandatory subject of bargaining for the exemption to
apply. The district court found that the eligibility rule was not such a mandatory
subject because it did not address wages, hours, or terms and conditions of
employment.197 The court noted that the rules made a class of players
unemployable while mandatory subjects of bargaining apply only to those who
are employed or eligible for employment.198 Wood, Caldwell, and Williams all
involved employed or drafted players and were therefore cited as consistent with
the district court’s distinction.199 The court of appeals held that the eligibility
rule was a mandatory subject of bargaining.200 The opinion noted that the
193. Nick Schwartz, The Average Career Earnings of Athletes Across America’s Major Sports Will
Shock You, FOR THE WIN (Oct. 24, 2013), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2013/10/average-career-earningsnfl-nba-mlb-nhl-mls. Current thinking is that a football running back only has so many carries in his
body, counting his collegiate and professional athletic life. Neil Greenberg, Running Backs’ NFL
Careers Are Getting Shorter and Their Impact Lessened, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2015), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2013/10/average-career-earnings-nfl-nba-mlb-nhl-mls.
194. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
625–26 (1975).
195. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
196. See Connell Construction Co., 421 U.S. at 622–23; Am Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No.
7, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Workers, 536 F.3d 68, 79 (1st Cir. 2008).
197. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393–95.
198. Id. at 393.
199. Id. at 394–95.
200. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 139 (2d Cir. 2004).
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eligibility rule had a tangible effect on the wages of current NFL players because
they are part of a complex scheme by which individual salaries in the NFL are
determined.201 The eligibility rules could therefore not be viewed in isolation
because they were part of the economic assumptions that supported the entire
NFL CBA.202 The opinion concluded by noting that the eligibility rule
diminished a veteran player’s risk of being replaced by either a drafted rookie
or an undrafted rookie free agent.203
The rationales given by Judge Sotomayor to support her conclusion that the
eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of bargaining again reveal a
misunderstanding of how the NFL actually works. As noted previously, the
number of drafted rookies is determined by the CBA itself.204 The number of
undrafted rookie free agents is effectively defined by the ninety-player limit on
training camp rosters placed on each team. These limits are consistently
applied regardless of the number of players eligible for the draft. The effect of
additional players eligible for the draft is only to increase marginally (1) the
time and money a team spends on scouting prospective players and (2) the
number of eligible players invited to the NFL Combine. Judge Sotomayor’s
second rationale is therefore misplaced. Precluding Clarett from eligibility does
not diminish the risk a veteran player faces of being replaced by a rookie. The
veteran is going to face the exact same number of rookies competing for his job
regardless of the size of the eligibility pool. The only argument that supports
the rationale is that, even though the numbers are the same, the quality of the
rookie player pool is reduced by eligibility restrictions and veterans would face
lessened competition from such less gifted players. However, such talent
disparities are a fact of life under the current eligibility rule as the pool of
prospective players are labeled in some years as “strong” and other years as
“weak.”205 If the eligibility rule was declared an antitrust violation, the talent
disparity would be most likely to occur in the first year of expanded eligibility
and would then return to the normal ebb and flow of annual talent assessment.
The infrequency of such a quality reduction occurring beyond the current norm
if the eligibility pool was expanded renders it of marginal utility in the
assessment of whether the eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Judge Sotomayor’s second rationale does not support her conclusion in this
regard.
The opinion’s first rationale also does not support its conclusion that the
201. Id. at 140.
202. Id. The complexity argument is unpersuasive. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
203. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 140.
204. Supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., RedRev, 2016 NBA Draft Class Preview, PEACHTREE HOOPS (Oct. 1, 2015),
http://www.peachtreehoops.com/2015/10/1/9421155/2016-nba-draft-class-preview-atlanta-hawks.
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eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The salary caps contained
in the NFL CBA in force at the time of the Clarett decision were in effect total
team caps. The rationale therefore had more validity then as higher rookie
compensation, at least hypothetically, took a larger percentage of the available
cap available to veterans. In fact, however, the rookie salaries frequently
increased veteran compensation as the teams struggled to justify paying
unproven players more than established NFL stars. During the period those
earlier NFL CBAs were in effect, veteran player salaries increased every year.206
However, even if an increase in veterans’ wages is considered an effect of the
rookie salaries permitted by the CBA in effect at the time of Clarett, the effect
had nothing to do with the eligibility rule. Rookie compensation at that time
was determined by NFL revenue (which determined the team salary cap) and
the draft position of the individual player. The size or quality of the pool from
which players were drafted did not influence general rookie compensation or,
by cause and effect, veteran wages.
The rationale employed by Judge Sotomayor has even less validity in
today’s NFL. The current CBA—the 2011 NFL CBA—provides in detail for a
Total Rookie Compensation Pool and a Year-One Rookie Compensation Pool
for both the entire NFL and for each individual team. 207 These amounts are
annually determined by a detailed process contained within the CBA.208 As part
of those calculations, each pick in the draft is given a suggested
compensation number and undrafted free agent compensation is regulated in
detail.209 These cap limits completely divorce the rookie compensation
packages from the amount of money available to veterans. These rookie
compensation restrictions are also completely unrelated to the number of
players eligible for the draft. If the eligibility rules were invalidated and more
players were eligible for the draft, the amount of the rookie caps would not
increase by $1. The rationale was not persuasive when written. Its logic
cannot be justified under current NFL and NBA conditions. The district court
in Clarett was correct in its assertion that a rule rendering someone
unemployable cannot be included within a subject that only relates to those
employed.210 The eligibility rule is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The
restriction is a group collaboration between the leagues, the unions, and the
NCAA to maintain profits and a monopoly position in the professional football
market by restraining trade.
206. See Mike J. Perry, Rising Income Inequality and the NFL Part 2, AEIDEAS (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.aei.org/publication/rising-income-inequality-and-the-nfl-part-2/.
207. NFL CBA, supra note 9, art 7 § (1)(c)–(d).
208. Id.
209. See id. art 7.
210. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 393–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

CLOSIUS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE JOCKS AND THE JU STI CE

6/14/2016 5:30 PM

519

VI. IF THE EXEMPTION DOES NOT APPLY, THE ELIGIBILITY RULES VIOLATE
SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
If the exemption is inapplicable, the validity of the restraints would again
be suspect pursuant to the reasoning in Haywood. The district court was
correct in holding that, if the exemption did not apply, section 1 of the Sherman
Act would only be violated if Clarett proved that he suffered an appropriate
antitrust injury and that the eligibility rule was an unreasonable restraint of
trade.211 “Antirust injury” means that Clarett must have sustained an injury the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent, caused by the defendants’ unlawful
activity.212 The Supreme Court has also indicated that an unreasonable restraint
in the sports industry needed to be proven under the Rule of Reason analysis.213
The per se rule of liability was inappropriate in sports given the uniqueness of
the industry and its particular need for joint or group activity to exist.214
Clarett had an antitrust injury because he alleged a group boycott that
created a barrier to entry in the labor market.215 He is not claiming that he was
harmed because he lost his job in a competitive environment. The eligibility
“[r]ule[s] preclude[d] Clarett from entering into [a] ‘fair and vigorous
competition’” for employment.216 He properly identified the relevant market as
the NFL labor market for player services.217 The district court concluded
“Clarett’s own injury—his inability to compete in the market—stems from
defendant’s activities.”218 Clarett therefore satisfied the Supreme Court’s
criteria for antitrust standing and injury. If the argument noted above that the
restraint affects both the labor and the product market is accepted, the required
antitrust injury is even clearer.
Clarett also properly alleged an unreasonable restraint of trade pursuant to
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The eligibility rule was clearly the product of
concerted or group activity by the thirty-two teams of the NFL, with at least the
tacit approval of the NFLPA.219 Therefore, section 1’s requirement of concerted
action between at least two legally distinct entities was satisfied.220 Although a
group boycott is normally a per se violation of section 1, because history has
211. Id. at 403–04.
212. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
213. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–03 (1984).
214. Id. at 100–01.
215. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d. at 399.
216. Id. at 401.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 403.
219. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 134–37 (2d Cir. 2004).
220. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
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proven that they are overwhelmingly likely to be anticompetitive, the district
court properly employed the Rule of Reason test required by Board of Regents
in the context of the sports industry.221 Under that analysis, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving that the restraint at issue has an adverse effect on competition
in the relevant market.222 If the plaintiff satisfies this obligation, the burden is
on the defendants to prove that procompetitive benefits of the restraint outweigh
the anticompetitive effects.223 If the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff
may show that the defendants’ procompetitive effects could have been produced
by less restrictive alternatives that would produce no or less anticompetitive
impact.224
Clarett easily satisfied his burden of proving an adverse effect on
competition because, even at common law, an agreement that precluded an
individual from practicing his chosen profession was invalid in the absence of
some form of compensation.225
“Age-based eligibility restrictions in
professional sports are anticompetitive because they limit competition in the
player personnel market by excluding sellers.”226 The district court therefore
focused its attention on the NFL’s four pro-competitive benefits of the
eligibility rule—protecting less mature players from the greater risk of injury in
NFL games, protecting the NFL’s product from the adverse consequences from
such injuries, protecting the NFL clubs from the costs and potential liabilities
of such injuries, and protecting from injury and self-abuse adolescents who
might over train or use performance-enhancing drugs to play sooner in the
NFL.227 The district court dismissed out of hand the first and fourth of the
benefits by concluding that although they were laudable concerns, they had
nothing to do with promoting competition.228 Therefore, they did not qualify as
pro-competitive benefits.229 The second and third benefits were also
unpersuasive.230 Cost savings manifested themselves in the product market, not
the labor market.231 Their impact was therefore irrelevant in the labor market
221. Id. at 404–05.
222. Id. at 404.
223. Id. at 405.
224. Id. at 405–06.
225. Such agreements are usually found in the context of covenants not to compete. See generally
Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement
of Employee Covenants Not to Compete—A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531 (1984).
226. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
227. Id. at 408.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 408–09.
231. Id. at 409. The NFL’s cost savings justifications under the Rule of Reason test effectively
confirm that the exemption should be denied because it has effects beyond the labor market. Id.; see
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alleged by Clarett.232 In addition, a group boycott that keeps costs down is
almost always cited as an adverse impact on the relevant market.233 The district
court refused to accept that an anticompetitive restraint could somehow be
turned into a pro-competitive benefit.234 “Indeed, the vast majority of
anticompetitive policies are instituted because they will be profitable to the
violators.”235
The district court concluded by noting that the pro-competitive benefits, if
any, of the eligibility rules could be accomplished by less restrictive
alternatives.236 If the pro-competitive effects are all based on a concern that
younger players are not physically or mentally ready to play in the NFL, age is
“a poor proxy” for being ready to play in the NFL.237 Because such readiness
is concededly a case-by-case decision, medical examinations and tests that
measure an individual’s maturity are better ways to determine a player’s
ability to be successful in the NFL.238 The NFL was, in fact, already performing
such examinations and tests in their extensive efforts to provide the teams with
the most complete information possible to assist in their decision whether a
prospect was worth selecting in the draft. The district court properly granted
Clarett’s motion for summary judgment, declared the eligibility rules to be a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and ordered that Clarett was eligible
to participate in the 2004 NFL draft.239
VII. CONCLUSION
The right to pursue a useful occupation has been a cherished right from the
beginnings of America.240 Judge Sotomayor deprived collegiate football and
basketball players of that right in an opinion that was wrong when it was
written and more inappropriate in the modern world of professional sports.
Clarett incorrectly applied the law it cited as relevant. The cases employed in
the opinion properly establish that some multi-employer group activity is
exempt from antitrust liability. Judge Sotomayor essentially derived from those
holdings that all multi-employer group activity is exempt from an antitrust
lawsuit by a labor group if it relates to a mandatory subject of bargaining. Such
also supra notes 120–30 and accompanying text.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 399.
234. Id. at 409.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 410.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 410–11.
240. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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an expansion is unprecedented, especially when applied to prospective players
who are not members of the union, not employees of the NFL, and not members
of the bargaining unit. In addition, the eligibility rule is not a mandatory subject
of bargaining because it is unrelated to wages, hours, or terms and conditions of
employees.
Clarett also errs in its failure to assess the relationship between the NFL and
college football. The eligibility rule supports monopoly profits for both the NFL
and the universities of Division I of the NCAA. At the same time, the rule is a
barrier to entry-level competition in the market of professional football. No
other case has ever permitted such a blatant violation of the Sherman Act to
escape antitrust liability through the non-statutory labor law exemption. In such
a context, antitrust policies and goals must outweigh the labor law interests, if
any, that are relevant.
Finally, the Clarett result is particularly egregious if it is applied to the
modern NFL or NBA. Under the current collective bargaining agreements in
both leagues, rookies cannot affect veteran wages and the size of the draft
eligibility pool cannot affect veteran job security. Finally, rookie compensation
in the NFL and NBA has escalated dramatically since 2004. Forcing a
prospective player to miss up to three years of NFL income or one year of NBA
income costs him millions of dollars he can never recoup. The modern impact
of the Clarett decision permits the members of the group boycott to make
hundreds of millions of dollars in monopoly profits at the expense of
prospective players. The eligibility rule should be declared a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the common law right of all Americans to
pursue an occupation of their choice should be reaffirmed.

